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Couples make use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) for a number of reasons:
they were unsuccessful at traditional attempts to conceive, or may anticipate
future impaired fertility. By creating frozen embryos for future use, IVF of-
fers the couple a chance at biological parenthood that may not otherwise be
available.
Sometimes, couples with frozen embryos decide to end their relation-
ships and cannot agree about whether or how their frozen embryos should be
used. Many courts have been forced to resolve disputes regarding the future
of frozen embryos. Applying various tests, courts historically refused to
award embryos to someone wishing to use them over the other progenitor's
objection. Recently, however, some courts have granted custody of frozen
embryos to progenitors wishing to implant them, notwithstanding the progen-
itor's objections. Thus, as IVF technology develops, courts and legislatures
will have to address a variety of novel issues with practical implications.
Part II of this article discusses several cases in which courts avoided
very difficult issues when refusing to permit embryo implantation over the
objections of a progenitor. The analyses of the facts and law were often un-
persuasive, as if the courts had a predetermined result that they sought to
justify. Part III discusses a few recent cases in which the court awarded pos-
session to the progenitor wishing to use the embryos, ex-partner's objections
notwithstanding. But many legislatures have not addressed the numerous is-
sues that implantation over a progenitor's objections might raise. The article
concludes with an outline of some of the issues that courts and legislatures
should consider when they confront the legal implications of children result-
ing from embryo implantation after the progenitors' relationships have
ended.
II. No INVOLUNTARY PARENTHOOD
Several state courts have addressed the proper way to resolve disputes
regarding the disposition of frozen embryos. Some courts have emphasized
the parties' understanding at the time the embryos were created; others have
required the consent of both progenitors before implantation can occur; and
still others have tried to balance competing interests when deciding who
should be awarded custody. Despite this varying methodology, the courts in
all of these cases reach the same result, either delaying or precluding implan-
tation, meaning that difficult issues that would have otherwise arisen were
not decided.
Mark Strasser is the Trustees Professor of Law at Capital University Law
School.
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A. Davis
Davis v. Davis was the first frozen embryo contest decided by a state
supreme court.' Mary Sue and Junior Davis sought to end their marriage and
have the court settle a dispute regarding the future of their seven frozen em-
bryos, stored in a Knoxville facility.2
Initially, Mary Sue wanted to implant the embryos herself in a post-
divorce effort to become pregnant and have a genetically related child.3 Jun-
ior objected, preferring to leave them in their cryopreserved state "until he
decided whether or not he wanted to become a parent outside the bounds of
marriage."4 By the time the case came before the Tennessee Supreme Court,
however, the parties' respective positions had shifted.
Both Junior and Mary Sue had remarried,5 and Mary Sue no longer
wished to use the embryos herself. Instead, she wanted to donate them to a
childless couple.6 Junior adamantly opposed implantation of the embryos,
instead preferring that the embryos be destroyed.7
The Tennessee court addressed several issues including whether fetuses
should be treated as persons or property,8 and whether prior agreements
about the disposition of frozen embryos should be enforceable against an
individual who subsequently had a change of heart.9 After all, individuals
with the benefit of hindsight might well not agree to provisions that seemed
perfectly acceptable at the time of the agreement. 10
The Davis court held that "preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either
'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
I. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992) (". . . [T]here are apparently
very few other litigated cases involving the disputed disposition of untransfer-
red 'frozen embryos,' and none is on point with the facts in this case").
2. Id. at 589.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 590.
6. Id.
7. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
8. Id. at 594.
9. Id. at 597 ("We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding dispo-
sition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as
the death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandon-
ment of the program) should be presumed valid and should be enforced as
between the progenitors.").
10. Id. ("[T]he parties' initial 'informed consent' to IVF procedures will often not
be truly informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating, emotionally
and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as the IVF process
unfolds.").
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special respect because of their potential for human life."'] Here, the court
attempted to steer clear of two views of the nature of frozen embryos. The
first view, adopted by the trial court, was that frozen embryos are legal per-
sons. 12 The Davis court rejected that view and suggested that such a holding
"would doubtless have . . . the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state
of Tennessee."13 The second view, adopted by the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals, was that embryos were mere property.14 The Tennessee Supreme Court
held that the "interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the
preembryos in this case is not a true property interest,"15 although the
Davises "do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preem-
bryos, within the scope of policy set by law."16 That authority included the
power to make sure that the preembryos were never used.'7 The high court
did not discuss how its holding may have differed if the appellate court had
been correct in its holding that embryos were appropriately considered mere
property. However, the Davis court noted that the fertility clinic was free to
follow its usual procedures with respect to unused embryos "as long as that
procedure is not in conflict with this opinion."18 By that, the court presuma-
bly meant that, at the very least, the embryos could not simply be donated to
a couple in need, even if that had been the clinic's standard procedure or
policy. 19
When analyzing the constitutional dimensions of the issue before it, the
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that "the right of procreational autonomy is
composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the
I. Id.
12. Id. at 595 ("[Tjhe trial court's ruling would have afforded preembryos the legal
status of 'persons' and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate
from those of their progenitors.").
13. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595. For a discussion of some of the possible effects on
assisted reproductive technologies that might occur in a state in which embryos
were treated as persons, see Mark Strasser, The Next Battleground? Per-
sonhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 65 OKLA. L. REV.
177, 213-20 (2013).
14. See id. at 596 ("[T]he Court of Appeals has left the implication that [Mary Sue
and Junior's interest in the embryos] is in the nature of a property interest.").
15. Id. at 597.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 604 ("[W]e can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis's interest in donation
is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding parenthood.").
18. Id. at 605.
19. Cf id. at 604 ("[I]if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely
to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater
interest and should prevail.").
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right to avoid procreation."20 The court analyzed the burdens imposed on
these rights by noting that for Junior "[a]ny disposition which results in the
gestation of the preembryos would impose unwanted parenthood on him,
with all of its possible financial and psychological consequences."2 Because
he was raised in a home for boys run by the Lutheran Church22 and had
severe problems caused by his separation from his parents,23 he did not want
his children raised in a single-parent home.24 Indeed, Junior claimed that he
did not want to donate the embryos to a married couple, precisely because of
the possibility that they might divorce.25
Ironically, Junior may have been less worried about his children living
in a single-parent household when the embryos were first created. The last
effort to harvest Mary Sue's eggs occurred in December 1988.26 In February
1989, when Junior filed for divorce, he "testified that he had known that their
marriage 'was not very stable' for a year or more, but had hoped that the
birth of a child would improve their relationship."27 But if the marriage was
not very stable, he presumably knew that the marriage might not last even if
he and Mary Sue had a child together, which might well mean that their child
would be raised in a single-parent home. In any event, the court held that
Mary Sue's interest in avoiding the "burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF
procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which she
contributed genetic material would never become children"28 could not out-
weigh Junior's interest in not being a parent.29 The court noted that "[t]he
case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the preembryos
herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable
means."30 The court further observed that even if Mary Sue were unable to
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id. at 603.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 603-04.
24. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 ("In light of his boyhood experiences, Junior Davis
is vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both par-
ents. Regardless of whether he or Mary Sue had custody, he feels that the
child's bond with the non-custodial parent would not be satisfactory.").
25. Id.
26. See id. at 592.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 604.
29. Id. ("While this is not an insubstantial emotional burden, we can only conclude
that Mary Sue Davis's interest in donation is not as significant as the interest
Junior Davis has in avoiding parenthood.").
30. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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become pregnant via IVF, "she could still achieve the child-rearing aspects
of parenthood through adoption."31
In its conclusion, the Tennessee court offered the following guidelines
for resolving progenitors' disputes about the use of frozen embryos. If they
had once agreed, then "their prior agreement concerning disposition should
be carried out."32 Because the Davises had no prior agreement with respect to
the disposition of the embryos in the event of divorce,33 the court employed a
balancing test; first establishing the factors to balance. For example, the Da-
vis court recognized that "the trauma (including both emotional stress and
physical discomfort) to which women are subjected in the IVF process is
more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men, [and] [i]n this sense,
it is fair to say that women contribute more to the IVF process than men."34
However, the court's balancing test did not include these factors, but others.
"Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by
means other than use of the preembryos in question."35 But, "[i]f no other
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preem-
bryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered,"36 assuming it is the pro-
genitor who wants to personally use them. "[I]f the party seeking control of
the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the ob-
jecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail."37 Thus,
the Davis court emphasized the importance of couples' expressly stating their
preferences at the time of the embryos creation. But absent explicit direc-
tions, a balancing test should be employed that favors the interests of the
progenitor seeking to avoid utilization of the embryos, because ordinarily the
embryos will not be implanted.38
B. Kass
In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the enforce-
ability of an agreement regarding the disposition of frozen embryos, even
though the enforcement would mean that one of the parties would never be a
parent of a biological child.39 Maureen Kass, divorced from Steven Kass,
wanted to implant the embryos that the couple created during their mar-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id. at 601.
35. Id. at 604.
36. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).
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riage.40 However, the couple agreed prior to the divorce that the embryos
would not be implanted.4'
It was not clear whether the agreement, made in anticipation of the di-
vorce, merely reiterated what had already been agreed at the time the em-
bryos were created 42 or, instead, represented an understanding that had not
existed previously.43 If that agreement simply incorporated the parties' origi-
nal understanding, then reliance interests might have been implicated be-
cause, but for that agreement, one of the parties would never have agreed to
create the embryos. 4 In addition, regardless of whether either party detri-
mentally relied on the agreement, it represented the parties' considered inten-
tions at the time of the creation of the embryos, before the emotions
associated with a possibly contentious divorce had colored their judgments.45
The facts of Kass illustrate other reasons an agreement at the time of
divorce might not reflect either the understanding that existed at the time the
embryos were created or even informed, deliberate decision-making. Con-
sider the following chronology of events. On May 20, Maureen Kass under-
went a procedure whereby sixteen eggs were retrieved, out of which nine
embryos were created.46 Four of those were transferred to Maureen Kass's
40. Id.
41. See id. at 177 ("With divorce imminent, the parties themselves on June 7,
1993-barely three weeks after signing the consents-drew up and signed an
'uncontested divorce' agreement, typed by appellant, including the following:
'The disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is that they
should be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent form and that
neither Maureen Kass[,] Steve Kass or anyone else will lay claim to custody of
these pre-zygotes.' ").
42. See id. at 181-82 ("[T]he 'uncontested divorce' instrument ... reaffirmed the
earlier understanding that neither party would alone lay claim to possession of
the pre-zygotes.").
43. Cf id. at 178 (noting that three appellate justices believed the that the IVF
consent was ambiguous).
44. A separate question is whether each party has the same understanding of the
agreement upon which he or she is detrimentally relying. See J.B. v. M.B., 783
A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001) ("M.B., in a cross-motion filed in July 1998 ...
certified that he and J.B. had agreed prior to undergoing the in vitro fertiliza-
tion procedure that any unused preembryos would not be destroyed, but would
be used by his wife or donated to infertile couples." However, J.B. testified that
he "endured the in vitro process and agreed to preserve the preembryos for our
use in the context of an intact family." J.B. also certified that "[t]here were
never any discussions between the Defendant and I regarding the disposition of
the frozen embryos should our marriage be dissolved."
45. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (noting that it is "particularly important that courts
seek to honor the parties' expressions of choice, made before disputes erupt,
with the parties' over-all direction always uppermost in the analysis").
46. Id. at 177.
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sister, who was willing to be the couple's surrogate. 47 Regrettably, a preg-
nancy did not result.48 In addition, Kass's sister announced her unwillingness
to again undergo the rigors associated with surrogacy. 49 This announcement
would have been the source of significant, additional disappointment, be-
cause Maureen might have felt that she no longer had any way to have a
biological child.50 The couple "then decided to dissolve their marriage,"5'
another possible cause of sorrow or depression.52
At this point, "the parties themselves on June 7, 1993-barely three
weeks after signing the consents-drew up and signed an 'uncontested di-
vorce' agreement."53 Was the agreement executed at the advice of counsel?
The opinion does not say. However, Maureen had a change of heart within
three weeks,54 which might indicate that she had not been well advised, had
not considered all relevant factors or, perhaps, that the prior decision-making
process had not been sufficiently deliberate.
Should Maureen have been held to her agreement? Perhaps, although
she had just experienced a series of events that may have seriously clouded
her judgment. Given her change of heart shortly after having agreed not to
use the embryos, and the lack of evidence that her ex-husband had detrimen-
47. Id.
48. Id. ("The couple learned shortly thereafter that the results were negative.").
49. See Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights
Law, 18 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 369, 375 n.50 (2012).
First, birth-control pills and shots of hormones are required to control and
suppress the surrogate's own ovulatory cycle and then injections of es-
trogen are given to build her uterine lining. After the transfer, daily injec-
tions of progesterone are administered until her body understands that it is
pregnant and can sustain the pregnancy on its own. The side effects of
these medications can include hot flashes, mood swings, headaches, bloat-
ing, vaginal spotting, uterine cramping, breast fullness, light headedness
and vaginal irritation.
(quoting Amrita Pande, Not an 'Angel,' not a 'Whore': Surrogates as 'Dirty'
Workers in India, 16 INDIA J. GEND. STUD. 141, 147 (2009)).
50. Kass doubted that she herself could have a successful pregnancy. See Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 175 ("[A]ppellant believed that, owing to prenatal exposure to dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES) she might have difficulty carrying a pregnancy to term
. . . .11).
51. Id. at 177.
52. Cf Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 967, 978-79 (2011) (discussing "the adverse effects of divorce on weaker
parties (especially women and children")).
53. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
54. See id. ("On June 28, 1993, appellant by letter informed the hospital and her
IVF physician of her marital problems and expressed her opposition to destruc-
tion or release of the pre-zygotes.").
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tally relied on her transitory willingness not to use the embryos, it is not at all
clear that the divorce agreement should have been enforced; unless it re-
flected the understanding at the time the embryos were created. A fuller re-
cord was required to determine whether the divorce agreement reflected that
understanding.55 Unfazed by the possibility that there might have been a vari-
ety of reasons that the agreement at the time of the couple's divorce did not
reflect their previous understanding, and unwilling to make this inquiry , the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed that the divorce agreement merely in-
corporated the couple's previous understanding.56
C. A.Z.
The New York Court of Appeals' approach to interpreting agreements is
illustrative when contrasted with the approach employed by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts. In A.Z v. B.Z., the court examined an agree-
ment awarding frozen embryos to the progenitor wishing to use them.57 A.Z.
and B.Z. "underwent IVF treatment from 1988 through 1991. As a result of
the 1991 treatment, the wife conceived and gave birth to twin daughters in
1992."58 However, the last egg retrieval and fertilization in 1991 resulted in
"more preembryos [being] formed than were necessary for immediate im-
plantation, and two vials of preembryos [being] frozen for possible future
implantation."59 In the spring of 1995, B.Z., the wife, had one of the vials of
embryos thawed and one embryo implanted.60 She never informed her hus-
band that she was doing this. Instead, he only learned of the implantation
when he received information from the insurance company regarding the
55. Cf id. at 178 ("[T]he dissent [in the intermediate appellate decision] would
remit the case to the trial court for a full hearing"); In re Marriage of Witten,
672 N.W.2d 768, 781-82 (Iowa 2003) ("Divorce stipulations are also distin-
guishable. While such agreements may address custody issues, they are con-
temporaneous with the implementation of the stipulation, an attribute
noticeably lacking in disposition agreements.").
56. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181-82 ("[T]he plurality properly looked to the 'uncon-
tested divorce' instrument, signed only weeks after the consents, to resolve any
ambiguity in the cited sentence, [which] .. .reaffirmed the earlier understand-
ing that neither party would alone lay claim to possession of the pre-zygotes.").
57. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2001).
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procedure. 6' Relations between the husband and wife further deteriorated,62
ultimately resulting in the husband filing for divorce.63
It is unclear from the opinion whether the relationship's deterioration
was due to the attempted implantation without consultation (as this is the
kind of decision that a couple would likely make jointly, and the husband
might have felt that his wife's unilateral action was a breach of a fundamen-
tal trust)64 or whether the relationship was already deteriorating and B.Z.
wanted to become pregnant before the couple divorced.65 In any event, the
parties were divorcing and a decision had to be made regarding the disposi-
tion of the embryos.
One complicating factor was that the couple had signed a consent form
before each egg retrieval and fertilization.66 The first time they signed the
form, the husband witnessed his wife fill it out to the effect "that if they
'[sihould become separated, [they] both agree[d] to have the embryo(s) ...
return[ed] to [the] wife for implant.' "67 However, the couple followed a dif-
ferent process when they signed each of the six subsequent consent forms.
The husband would sign a blank form, which the wife then filled in and
signed.68 It was not as if the wife surreptitiously changed the substance of the
forms when given a blank, signed document. To the contrary, "[a]ll the
words she wrote in the later forms were substantially similar to the words she
inserted in the first October, 1988, form."69 Nonetheless, the court viewed the
fact that the husband had submitted a signed, blank form, on which the wife
61. Id.
62. Cf id. ("The wife sought and received a protective order against the husband
under G.L. c. 209A.").
63. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053 ("During this period relations between the husband
and wife deteriorated. The wife sought and received a protective order against
the husband under G.L. c. 209A. Ultimately, they separated and the husband
filed for divorce.").
64. Or, it may be that the couple had been discussing having another child and A.Z.
had adamantly refused. See Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get
the House (and the Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos
upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1187 (2009) ("There was no discussion
in the opinion whether, for example, A.Z. and B.Z. had discussed having more
children prior to her last attempt and A.Z. had been adamant in not wanting
more ....").
65. See A.Z.,725 N.E.2d at 1187-88.
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simply wrote what the previous agreement had said, as somehow contrary to
the husband's continued consent to the first form's provisions.70
The court's analysis was unpersuasive in other respects as well. For ex-
ample, despite the clear language that "on the donors' separation, the preem-
bryos were to be given to one of the donors for implantation,"71 the court
concluded that it was "dubious at best that it represents the intent of the
husband and the wife regarding disposition of the preembryos in the case of a
dispute between them."72 Further, even if that form represented the intent at
the time of each signing, the court noted that the "form [did] not state, and
the record [did] not indicate, that the husband and wife intended the consent
form to act as a binding agreement between them should they later disagree
as to the disposition."73 Of course, if the parties did not intend the form to be
legally binding, then one might not require exacting care in the drafting of
the form. This is especially true where a person lacking legal training created
the document. Nonetheless, because the form discussed the disposition of the
embryos should the couple "separate" rather than "divorce," the court sug-
gested that the declaration had no application with respect to the disposition
of the embryos upon the couple's divorce.74
The court's interpretation is more easily understood when one considers
the court's statement that "even had the husband and the wife entered into an
unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of the
frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that would compel
one donor to become a parent against his or her will."75 This position is a
stronger version of the position articulated in Davis.76 The Davis court sug-
gested that when performing the balancing test focusing on "the joys of
parenthood that is desired or the relative anguish of a lifetime of unwanted
parenthood,"77 courts should "[o]rdinarily [hold that] the party wishing to
70. Id. at 1057.
71. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1057 ("[T]the form uses the term '[s]hould we become separated' in
referring to the disposition of the frozen preembryos without defining 'become
separated.' Because this dispute arose in the context of a divorce, we cannot
conclude that the consent form was intended to govern in these
circumstances.").
75. Id.; see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) ("We believe that the
better rule, and the one we adopt, is to enforce agreements entered into at the
time in vitro fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party to change
his or her mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any
stored preembryos.").
76. Compare A.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, with Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
77. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
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avoid procreation should prevail."78 However, the Davis court would have
enforced a clear and unambiguous contract specifying that the party wishing
to use the embryos would get them.79 The Massachusetts court rejected that
even a clear and unambiguous agreement about embryo disposition should be
enforced, if that enforcement would mean that a progenitor might become a
parent against his or her will.80
D. Litowitz
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court avoided some
difficult issues in an embryo custody dispute.81 The court interpreted a
couple's contract with a fertility center in a particular way, and then enforced
that interpretation even though it did not reflect the current wishes of either
party. 82 Becky and David Litowitz married after having a child together.83
Shortly after giving birth, Becky had a hysterectomy, leaving her unable to
produce eggs or carry a child to term. 84 Nonetheless, the Litowitzes wished to
have another child,85 so they created embryos with donor eggs and Litowitz'
sperm, 86 and then employed a surrogate who gave birth to their daughter.87
Their two remaining embryos were cryopreserved at a California fertility
clinic.88 The contract between the Litowitzes and the egg donor specified the
following:
All eggs produced by the Egg Donor pursuant to this Agreement
shall be deemed the property of the Intended Parents and as such,
the Intended Parents shall have the sole right to determine the dis-
position of said egg(s). In no event may the Intended Parents al-
78. Id. at 604.
79. See id. at 597 ("We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such
as the death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or aban-
donment of the program) should be presumed valid and should be enforced as
between the progenitors.").
80. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057.
81. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
82. See id.




87. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262 ("Three of the five preembryos were implanted in a
surrogate mother, producing a female child, M., who was born January 25,
1997.").
88. Id. at 262-63.
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low any other party the use of said eggs without express written
permission of the Egg Donor.89
The contract with the fertility clinic specified that specific actions would
take place as soon as one of the following triggering events occurred:
A. The death of the surviving spouse or in the event of our si-
multaneous death.
B. In the event we mutually withdraw our consent for participa-
tion in the cryopreservation program.
C. Our pre-embryos have been maintained in cryopreservation
for five (5) years after the initial date of cryopreservation un-
less the Center agrees, at our request. to extend our participa-
tion for an additional period of time.
D. The Center ceases its in vitro fertilization and cryopreserva-
tion program. 90
The action choices upon the occurrence of the triggering event included:
(1) That our pre-embryos be donated to another infertile couple
(who shall remain unknown to all parties concerned), selected
by the attending physician and/or the medical director of the
Program, in which case we would relinquish any and all claim
of maternal and/or paternal right to the donated pre-embryos;
(2) That our pre-embryos be donated for approved research and/
or investigation;
(3) That our pre-embryos be thawed but not allowed to undergo
further development:
(4) That our pre-embryos be disposed of in accordance with the
best judgment [sic] of the professional staff of the Center.9'
The Litowitzes made clear that their choice was "#3-That our pre-em-
bryos be thawed but not allowed to undergo further development,"92 although
they subsequently changed their minds. When they filed for divorce, David
wanted the remaining embryos donated to another couple, while Becky
wanted them implanted in a surrogate,93 perhaps so that M., their daughter,94
might have a sibling with the same genetic parents.
Using the best interest test, the trial court awarded the embryos to
David.95 The court offered several reasons:
89. Id. at 263.
90. Id. at 263-64.
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id.
93. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 264.
94. See id. (discussing "their daughter, M").
95. Id.
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1. "The child would be a child of a single parent. That is not in
the best interest of a child that could have an opportunity to
be brought up by two parents.
2. [T]he child may have a life of turmoil as the child of divorced
parents.
3. [B]oth parties here are old enough to be the grandparents of
any child, and that is not an ideal circumstance."96
The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that David could not be forced to be
a parent against his will;97 Becky appealed.98
An additional complicating factor was that David sought to demonstrate
to the Washington Supreme Court that Becky used drugs. David presented
evidence of Becky's alleged drug use to the trial court resulting in David
being awarded primary custody of M.99 He also wanted to submit evidence
suggesting that Becky had sought to hire someone to kill him.0o
Becky claimed that she had the same rights to control the disposition of
the embryos as did David by virtue of the contract with the egg donor.10, But
the court reasoned that the contract with the egg donor controlled the disposi-
tion of the eggs, not the embryos that had been created from those eggs.102
Thus, as a condition of receiving the eggs, the couple had to show that they
would not be sold or donated to anyone else, although the Litowitzes were
free to use, or perhaps destroy, the eggs as they saw fit.103
The Litowitz court also noted that "[tihe cryopreservation contract pro-
vided 'in the event [the Litowitzes] are unable to reach a mutual decision
regarding the disposition of [their] pre-embryos, they must petition a court of
competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate disposition
96. Id.
97. Id. at 265 ("In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals concluded the
contracts signed by Petitioner and Respondent in California did not require
Respondent to continue with their family plan to have another child and that
Respondent's right not to procreate compelled the court to award the preem-
bryos to him.").
98. Id.
99. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 265.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 268 ("The contract provides that the intended parents, Petitioner and Re-
spondent, have a right to determine disposition of the eggs. Even though Re-
spondent Litowitz, as the intended father, indeed has a biological connection to
the preembryos, he has no greater contractual right to the eggs than Petitioner
Litowitz has as the intended mother. Under that contract, Petitioner and Re-
spondent would have equal rights to the eggs.").
102. Id. ("But the egg donor contract does not relate to the preembryos which re-
sulted from subsequent sperm fertilization of the eggs.").
103. Id. at 262.
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of [their] pre-embryos."'104 That is exactly what the couple did when they
could not agree about the disposition of the embryos.05
Yet, litigation takes time, 06 and the initial five-year cryopreservation
term discussed in the agreement had already passed by the time the Washing-
ton Supreme Court issued an opinion. The Litowitz court explained that
"[u]nder the five-year termination provision of the cryopreservation contract,
the Center is directed by the Litowitzes to thaw the preembryos, and not
allow them to develop any further."107 Indeed, it was not even clear "whether
the two preembryos still exist[ed]" 108 and, as the court noted, the case before
the court would be moot if the clinic had already destroyed the embryos.109
The court reasoned that it did not have to decide whether Becky (who
was not genetically related to the embryos) and David (who was) stood on
the same footing with respect to the control of those embryos.10 Instead,
because the time at which the embryos were to be thawed had already
104. Id. at 268.
105. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 273 (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("David and Becky
Litowitz contracted that if they could not reach an agreement on the disposition
of their remaining preembryos they were contractually bound to 'petition to a
Court of competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate dis-
position of' their preembryos. That is exactly what they did, and well within
the five-year time frame.") (quoting from Petitioner's Ex. 410, at 3).
106. See Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of Congressional Power Before and After
Shelby County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 291 (2013-2014) ("liti-
gation is slow").
107. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 269.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 269.
110. Id. at 271 ("It is not necessary for this court to engage in a legal, medical or
philosophical discussion whether the preembryos in this case are 'children,' nor
whether Petitioner (who was not a biological participant) is a progenitor as is
Respondent (who was a biological participant)."); Cf Deborah L. Forman, Em-
bryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not the Answer,
24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 101 (2011) ("Where only one member of
the couple contributes gametes, only that party will have a genetic connection
to the embryo and any resulting child. We might expect courts to view the
gamete provider as the person with the greater claim to the embryo in the event
of a dispute, although no statute or court precedent has yet made that clear.").
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passed,",I the court suggested that the resolution of the case was easy-the
embryos should be discarded.112
This was not a satisfactory resolution of the case." 13 First, assuming that
the embryos had not yet been destroyed, it was at least possible that the
parties might agree about the disposition of the embryos, if only to continue
cryopreservation until an agreement could be reached."14 Assuming that the
fertility clinic agreed,' '5 preserving the status quo would have been in accord
with the contract. Second, the couple sought a court's determination of the
proper disposition of the embryos long before the five-year time period had
elapsed.116 Arguably, when they sought guidance from the court they tolled
the five-year limitation.' '7 Even if the Washington Supreme Court held to the
contrary, that would not justify ordering the destruction of the embryos if
they were still cryopreserved, especially considering neither party had asked
to have the embryos destroyed.18
Yet, the court's order to destroy the embryos meant that several difficult
issues would not be addressed. For example, the trial court used a best inter-
est analysis to determine that David should receive the embryos. But such an
approach would require further clarification. Should best interests be used
only if the couple initially agrees that it be used or should that test be used
generally in the IVF context? Using that test generally in the IVF context
might have a chilling effect on the number of couples willing to freeze em-
bryos, because some individuals may be unwilling to create embryos unless
111. Id. at 271 ("Neither Petitioner nor Respondent has requested an extension of
their contract with the Loma Linda Center. Under terms of the contract, then,
the remaining preembryos would have been thawed out and not allowed to
undergo further development five years after the initial date of cryopreserva-
tion, which by simplest calculation would have occurred on March 24, 2001.").
112. Id. at 274 (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("But the majority's disposition apparently
calls for the destruction of unborn human life even when, or if, both contracting
parties agreed the preembryos should be brought to fruition as a living child
reserving their disagreement over custody for judicial determination.").
113. See Forman, supra note 110, at 63 (2011) (describing Litowitz as "a rather
mystifying decision").
114. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 263-64 (provision discussing extension of the five-year
cryopreservation period).
115. See id. at 263 (the clinic's willingness was required for extension).
116. See id. at 273 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting that assistance from the courts
had been sought "well within the five-year time frame").
117. Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("the judicial action which provided for the disposi-
tion of the preembryos was commenced well within the five-year window
thereby tolling the contracted period of limitations").
118. See id. at 274 (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("One thing the parties obviously did not
intend was to destroy the whole object of the contract, the pre-embryos.").
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they are certain they would be able to use the embryos later should they
desire to do so." 9
If the best interests test is to be used, what criteria should be employed?
Age? Whether the parent is single? The trial court mentioned these factors120
but the couple likely did not anticipate that these were the kinds of factors
that would be used by a court authorized to make a decision for them.121
Some commentators suggest that, at the time they create embryos,
couples may have some difficulty predicting how they will feel about using
or donating those embryos years later.122 That point is well-taken; although,
the same point might be made about other actions involving parenthood.23
Further, difficulties may only be compounded if couples are advised to in-
clude within their cryopreservation agreements a provision authorizing a
court to decide the appropriate disposition of the embryos should the couple
fail to come to an agreement.124 First, the Litowitzes incorporated such a
119. Justin Trent, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
1143, 1144 (2006) ("Legal uncertainty about embryo control, parentage, and
surrogacy contracts, creates a higher risk to would-be parents' rights, which
could have a chilling effect on their decisions to engage in ART."); Cf John A.
Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1872
(2003) ("Detrimental reliance by others is a good reason for enforcing Time I
expressions of Time 2 preferences despite one party's Time 2 objections.").
120. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 264.
121. Someone like Becky who wanted them for her own use would likely not agree
to a best interests test that made it less likely that she would be awarded cus-
tody because of her age. Further, because these disputes usually occur when the
adults' relationship has broken down, it would be eminently foreseeable that
she would be seeking to use them as a single parent. Finally, at least in part
because people often have very strong feelings about the use or non-use of the
embryos, the adults' relationship might well be less than amicable if they con-
tinued to be unable to agree about the disposition of the embryos. Even if the
couple did not anticipate divorce, each party might nonetheless object to crite-
ria that would foreseeably weigh against being able to use the embryos, should
that person desire to do so. See id. (listing some of the court's criteria).
122. See Forman, supra notel 10 , at 74 (expressing "concerns about patients' inabil-
ity to accurately predict their future preferences regarding disposition").
123. Cf Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 383
(2010) ("Many birth parents, interviewed after the fact, 'expressed incredulity
that they entrusted their child to strangers,' and nearly half of the birth parents
interviewed described the decision to give their children up for adoption as a
mistake they wished they could undo.").
124. See Forman, supra note 110, at 100 ("clinic consent forms should be drafted to
make clear that disputes between the progenitors in the event of divorce or
comparable change in relationship status will be decided by a court or other
binding alternative dispute resolution process if the parties cannot reach agree-
ment at that time").
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provision in their cryopreservation agreement. 25 That only resulted in pro-
longed litigation that resulted in an outcome undesired by both parties. Sec-
ond, by authorizing a third party to decide who will be awarded the embryos
without specifying, for example, the criteria to be used in a best interests
analysis, the couple would only be adding another element of uncertainty.
The parties would not know whether their own views at the time of embryo
creation would remain consistent over time. They also would not know what
views the judge making the decision would have. One judge might empha-
size age,126 while another would not. 127 Another judge might emphasize the
importance of a two-parent family over a single- parent family.128 This might
prove an especially heart-wrenching criterion in some cases. Consider a mar-
ried couple with several frozen embryos to be used in IVF. They never have
a successful pregnancy. They have a contentious break-up because one of the
parties has an affair with someone whom that party plans to marry as soon as
the divorce is final. It would add insult to injury for the aggrieved ex-spouse
to lose custody of the embryos to the other ex-spouse and his or her new
marital partner.
Reasoning that David should not be forced to be a parent against his
will, the intermediate appellate court agreed that David Litowitz should be
awarded the embryos. 129 Donating embryos is different than destroying them.
While David would not be the legal father of any children born as a result of
the implantation of donated embryos, he still would have been their biologi-
cal father and might have had some psychological reaction to such children
being in the world.30 Perhaps he would not have been bothered by knowing
that there might be a child in the world genetically related to him whohe
would never know. One of the reasons that the frozen embryo disputes have
been so difficult to resolve is that the right not to procreate has been inter-
preted to include more than the right not to have parental responsibility for
any child born of a post-divorce implantation. Otherwise, many of the con-
tentious frozen embryo disputes would have been much easier to resolve-
one individual would have his or her right to procreate respected by being
125. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268.
126. See id. at 264.
127. Cf Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (8) (West 2011) ("As between the parents of a
child, no preference may be given to either parent in the awarding of custody
because of that parent's age, sex, or financial status, nor because of the age or
sex of the child.").
128. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 264.
129. In other contexts, individuals might unwillingly become parents with support
obligations even if conception occurred as a result of intentional deception. See
Strasser, supra note 64, at 1189-92.
130. Cf Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 (discussing the possible "psychological conse-
quences" for Junior if the embryos he helped create were used to produce
children).
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awarded the embryos while the other individual would have his or her right
not to procreate respected by having his or her parental rights and obligations
terminated. 131
E. Witten
In all of the cases discussed thus far, the court precluded implantation of
the disputed embryos, often by privileging the wishes of one of the parties.
However, the Litowitz court barred implantation even when neither party
sought such a remedy. It is, of course, true that the court could simply decide
to preserve the status quo and order that the embryos remain frozen until the
parties reached a resolution.
In In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed different
approaches to resolving a frozen embryo dispute: (1) the contractual ap-
proach, (2) the contemporaneous mutual consent model, and (3) the balanc-
ing test. 32 After discussing the benefits and drawbacks of each,133 the court
decided to preserve the status quo. 13 4
Arthur and Tamera Witten were seeking a divorce and they could not
agree about the proper disposition of their frozen embryos. Tamera wished to
keep the seventeen frozen embryos so that she would be able to raise a bio-
logical child.135 Were implantation to lead to a successful pregnancy, Tamera
would allow Arthur to choose between parenting the child or terminating his
parental rights.136 She opposed destroying or donating the embryos.137 Arthur
131. See infra notes 178-194 and accompanying text (discussing Nash v. Nash in
which this approach was employed).
132. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
133. Id. at 776-79.
134. Id. at 783 ("A better principle to apply, we think, is the requirement of contem-
poraneous mutual consent. Under that model, no transfer, release, disposition,
or use of the embryos can occur without the signed authorization of both do-
nors. If a stalemate results, the status quo would be maintained.").
135. Id. at 772 ("Tamera asked that she be awarded 'custody' of the embryos. She
wanted to have the embryos implanted in her or a surrogate mother in an effort
to bear a genetically linked child.").
136. Id. at 772 ("She testified that upon a successful pregnancy she would afford
Trip [Arthur] the opportunity to exercise parental rights or to have his rights
terminated.").
137. Id. at 772-73 ("She adamantly opposed any destruction of the embryos, and
was also unwilling to donate the eggs to another couple.").
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also did not want the embryos destroyed.138 He was willing to donate them
but did not want Tamera to use them.139
Rejecting the contractual approach, the Witten court held "that agree-
ments entered into at the time [IVF] is commenced are enforceable and bind-
ing on the parties, 'subject to the right of either party to change his or her
mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
embryo.' "140 Under the "contemporaneous mutual consent"14 model adopted
by the Iowa court, "no transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos
can occur without the signed authorization of both donors."142 The court un-
derstood that in many cases there would be no agreement. In that event, "the
status quo would be maintained."143 In the Wittens' case, the lack of agree-
ment meant that the embryos would remain cryopreserved44 with "the party
or parties who oppose destruction . . . responsible for any storage fees."145
The Witten court's approach has certain advantages. For example,
couples at the time of divorce might be so angry that they would be unable to
agree about anything and, indeed, one party might take a position just to spite
the other. After time had passed, however, the parties might be able to reach
a compromise that would make everyone better off.
The Witten approach also has drawbacks. In Witten, both Arthur and
Tamera opposed the destruction of the embryos.146 But after hearing that cry-
opreservation costs would be borne by the party opposing destruction,147 it
might be tempting for the party who cared less about the disposition of the
embryos to withdraw any objections to their destruction, confident that the
other party would continue to protect them and bear the full costs of doing
so.148 Perhaps of more concern is that one party might take advantage of
another party's desire to be a genetic parent, and leverage this desire to se-
138. Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773 ("Trip testified at the trial that.., he
did not want the embryos destroyed.").
139. Id. ("[H]e did not want Tamera to use them. He would not oppose donating the
embryos for use by another couple.").
140. Id. at 782 (quoting J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001)).
141. Id. at 783.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783 ("Turning to the present case, . . . the
parties have been unable to reach a new agreement that is mutually
satisfactory.").
145. Id.
146. See id. at 772-73.
147. Id. at 783.
148. Strasser, supra note 64, at 1210 ("Someone who wanted to get back at an ex-
spouse might well say that he or she had no interest in cryopreserving the
embryos, thereby shifting the costs to his or her ex-spouse.").
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cure concessions on property distribution or spousal support that could not
have been otherwise obtained.149
The Witten court seemed confident that requiring contemporaneous con-
sent would mean that if the parties disagreed, the embryos would remain
frozen until the parties agreed to destroy them,5 0 because the party wishing
to use them would eventually either tire of waiting, or feel too old to par-
ent.15' But this view ignores how the party with veto power might exact a
heavy emotional or financial price upon the ex-spouse who was intensely
committed to becoming a genetic parent.152
F. Roman
In the cases discussed above, embryos were implanted, although not
always successfully. In Davis,53 Kass,154 and Witten,155 no child was born as
a result of IVF. In contrast, in A.Z. 156 and Litowitz,57 the use of IVF led to
149. Id. ("[T]he embryos might in effect be held hostage-they would be released
for use only if the ex-spouse were willing to give up something valuable in
return, for example, in a property settlement or in exchange for more favorable
support terms.").
150. Marriage of Witten, 672 M.W.2d at 783 ("The practical effect will be that the
embryos are stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the
fertilized eggs.").
151. But cf Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 264 (Wash. 2002) (noting that "both
parties here are old enough to be the grandparents of any child").
152. See Strasser, supra note 64, at 1210 ("[O]ne could imagine such a person im-
posing continuing psychic damage by hinting that he or she might consent to
the ex-spouse's use of the embryos sometime in the future-the ex-spouse
might well continue to be on an emotional rollercoaster when considering the
possibility of finally becoming a parent.").
153. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992) ("[T]he Davises went
through six attempts at IVF, at a total cost of $35,000, but the hoped-for preg-
nancy never occurred.").
154. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175-76 (N.Y. 1998) ("Now divorced, ap-
pellant (Maureen Kass) wants the pre-zygotes implanted, claiming this is her
only chance for genetic motherhood .... [A]ppellant underwent the egg re-
trieval process five times and fertilized eggs were transferred to her nine times.
She became pregnant twice-once in October 1991, ending in a miscarriage
and again a few months later, when an ectopic pregnancy had to be surgically
terminated.").
155. See Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772 ("Tamera then underwent several
unsuccessful embryo transfers in an attempt to become pregnant.").
156. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2001) ("As a result of the
1991 treatment, the wife conceived and gave birth to twin daughters in 1992.").
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the birth of a child. In Roman v. Roman, 158 however, the couple creating the
embryos never implanted them,59 although they unsuccessfully tried artifi-
cial insemination.160
At the time Randy and Augusta Roman created their embryos, the
couple signed an agreement "authoriz[ing] the storage of the embryos in a
frozen state until the Center determined that appropriate conditions existed
for transfer of the embryos to the woman's uterus and both husband and wife
agreed to the transfer."16 In addition, the agreement specified that "the par-
ties chose to discard the embryos in case of divorce."162 When Randy filed
for divorce,63 the couple agreed about everything but the disposition of the
embryos.164 Randy Roman wanted the embryos discarded,65 but Augusta
wanted them implanted.166 Augusta said that in the event of a live birth,
Randy would have neither parental rights nor parental responsibilities.I67
157. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262 (Wash. 2002) ("Three of the five
preembryos were implanted in a surrogate mother, producing a female child,
M., who was born January 25, 1997.").
158. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
159. See id. at 42-43 ("On the night before the implantation, Randy expressed feel-
ings to Augusta that led him to withdraw his consent to the implantation sched-
uled for the next day .... A month after they decided to wait, the parties signed
an agreement to unfreeze three embryos and implant them. The agreement was
contingent on the parties' obtaining approval from a counselor. That agreement
never took effect because Randy and Augusta did not progress through coun-
seling."). Id. at 52 ("Augusta argues that she understood the embryo agreement
to apply to remaining embryos only after implantation had occurred. She testi-
fied that she never agreed to destroy all the embryos without an opportunity to
get pregnant.").




163. Id. at 43 ("On December 10, 2002, Randy filed for divorce and Augusta filed a
counterclaim for divorce that included claims for fraud and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.").
164. See Roman, 193 S.W.3d ("The parties reached a final binding agreement during
mediation as to the division of the marital property, except for the frozen
embryos.").
165. See id. ("Randy asked the trial court to uphold their written agreement, which
specified that the embryos be discarded.").
166. See id. ("Augusta wanted the opportunity to have the embryos implanted so
that she could have a biological child.").
167. Id. ("If any children were born from the embryos, Augusta stated that Randy
would not have parental rights or responsibilities.").
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The court reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions and inferred that
there was "an emerging majority view that written embryo agreements be-
tween embryo donors and fertility clinics to which all parties have consented
are valid and enforceable, so long as the parties have the opportunity to with-
draw their consent to the terms of the agreement."168 However, the Roman
court noted that it was not bound by other states' laws, and sought to deter-
mine what local public policy required.169 After considering various state
laws, the court announced that Texas policy somewhat differed from other
states by "[a]llowing the parties voluntarily to decide the disposition of fro-
zen embryos in advance of cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of
mind, jointly expressed, [because it] best serves the existing public policy of
this State and the interests of the parties."170 Because the parties agreed to
destroy the embryos in the event of divorce, the court ruled that the embryos
had to be destroyed.17'
The policy announced by the Roman court differed from the policy an-
nounced in Witten, in that the Roman court decided the initial agreement was
enforceable unless both parties agreed to change the terms, 72 whereas the
Witten court said that the original agreement was only enforceable if both
parties still agreed to those terms.1 73 Essentially, the Witten rule precludes
any action unless both parties consent, but the Roman rule requires that the
original contract be enforced, absent agreement to the contrary. While no
implantation occurred in either case, a separate question is whether the Ro-
168. Id. at 48.
169. Id. at 48 ("Because we are not bound by state law from other jurisdictions,
however, we will also review our own statutes to determine the public policy of
this State in the context of embryo agreements.").
170. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 50.
171. See id. at 54-55 ("[T]the embryo agreement provides that the frozen embryos
are to be discarded in the event of divorce .... [T]he trial court abused its
discretion in not enforcing the embryo agreement."); see also In re Marriage of
Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) ("According to the
agreement here, the parties designated wife to be the decision maker regarding
the embryos. Wife's stated preference for disposition of the embryos is ex-
pressed in the trial court's order to destroy them, absent husband's renewed
agreement to donate them for scientific research.").
172. See Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 49-50.
173. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003) (initial agree-
ment enforceable "subject to the fight of either party to change his or her mind
about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored embryo."
(citing J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001)).
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man court would have awarded the embryos to Augusta if the original agree-
ment had so specified.74
There are different ways to understand the various decisions involving
frozen embryo disputes described above.175 For example, as the Witten court
mentioned, one way to describe these cases is to note that different courts
used one of three approaches: the contract model, the contemporaneous con-
sent model, or interest balancing.176 However, some commentators have
pointed out that there was a common result in these cases, even if the state
courts used differing rationales. Namely, the embryos were never implanted
against the wishes of one of the progenitors.177 As the cases discussed in the
next section illustrate, however, the no-implantation-over-progenitor-objec-
tions rule is not always observed.
III. A NEW TREND?
Recently, courts have been using some of the previously approved ap-
proaches to resolve embryo disputes in a way that results in the implantation
of embryos, wishes to the contrary of one of the progenitors notwithstanding.
While there have been too few cases to conclude that there is a new trend,
this development is noteworthy for a few reasons. Mainly, the development
could mean that both individuals who enter into such agreements and those
professionals who advise them may have to modify existing practices. The
cases involved a variety of fact patterns, some of which were reminiscent of
the fact patterns that had occurred in the earlier cases.
A. Nash
In re Marriage of Nash involved an embryo dispute between James and
Tina Nash at the time of their divorce.178 The cryopreservation agreement
gave Tina the right to decide the disposition of the embryos,79 but the couple
subsequently agreed that a court could determine who would be awarded
174. See Strasser, supra note 64, at 1217 ("Some of the language of the Roman
decision suggests that an initial decision to give custody to Augusta would have
been enforceable .... ").
175. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
176. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 774.
177. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1021 (2010) ("Every court to rule on the issue has prohib-
ited implantation even when the couple had signed an agreement that would
have allowed it.").
178. In re Marriage of Nash, No. 62553-5-1, 2009 WL 1514842 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009).
179. See id. at *1 ("[T]he provision in the cryopreservation agreement.., gave Tina
Nash the authority to determine disposition of the pre-embryos"); see also id. at
*2 ("Disposition of embryos to be determined by Patient.").
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custody of the embryos. 180 Reminiscent of what occurred in A.Z, the husband
testified that his wife filled out the form and that he signed the cryopreserva-
tion form without having read it.181
While James argued that the cryopreservation agreement was not con-
trolling because its applicability expired,82 the court decided the case on dif-
ferent grounds. The form itself directed that provisions would control only
"if not addressed in the divorce settlement."183 The trial court held that "be-
cause the issue of which party would control the pre-embryos was addressed
in the mediation agreement by directing the court to decide,"84 the cry-
opreservation form's designation of Tina was not controlling.185
The trial court engaged in an interest-balancing test. It noted that John
wanted to have more children,86 and that it would not be reasonable to create
more frozen embryos, especially given his advancing age. 87 One element
that played a role was that donor eggs were used to create the embryos at
issue.188 But that meant that even if use of the frozen embryos led to a live
birth, Tina would not have been forced to be a genetic parent against her
will.189 That said, Tina was the mother of two children born from frozen
180. See In re Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *1 ("[T]he parties agreed the court
would decide which party would have control over the frozen pre-embryos[.]");
id. at *3 ("James also testified that a 'key part' of the agreement the parties
reached at the mediation was that Judge North would decide which party would
control the disposition of the remaining preembryos.").
181. See In re Nash, 2009 WL 1518482 ("James also testified that he did not read
the cryopreservation agreement before signing it. James said that Tina signed
the agreement first and initialed certain provisions, then gave him the agree-
ment and told him to 'initial here."'); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,
1054 (Mass. 2001) ("[I]n A.Z., the husband had testified that he had signed a
blank form and that his wife had then filled it in.").
182. See Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *3 ("James also argued that ... the donor
agreement expired six months after completion of the retrieval procedure.");
see also id. at *2 ("The donor agreement also provides that the terms of the
agreement are only effective for six months from the date of completion of the
retrieval procedure.").
183. In re Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *2.
184. Id. at *3.
185. See id.
186. See id. at *4 ("Husband wants the option of becoming a parent again.").
187. See id. ("The husband's alternatives to achieve parenthood are not reasonable,
as it would require him to restart the expensive process and the success of the
process is questionable due to his age.").
188. See id. at *2 ("James and Tina entered into an agreement with an anonymous
egg donor for the IVF procedure.").
189. See Nash, 2009 WL 1518458, at *4 ("Husband utilizing the embryos to procre-
ate would not force wife into becoming a biological parent against her will.").
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embryos, 90 and any children born of the remaining frozen embryos would be
genetic siblings of the two children.191
The trial court also ruled that Tina would have no rights or obligations
with respect to any children born of the contested embryos.192 Tina appealed
the court's holding that she would have no parental rights, noting that Wash-
ington state law "provides that a mother-child relationship is established by
'a valid surrogate parentage contract."'193 However, Washington law also
provides:
If a marriage is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm, or an
embryo, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child
unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted re-
production were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would
be a parent of the child.194
Because of the absence of a record specifying her willingness to be a parent
to any embryos born after the divorce, Tina was considered a legal stranger
to any child resulting from the post-divorce implantation.
Precisely because Tina Nash was not genetically related to the embryos,
she did not have a claim that using embryos over her objections would some-
how violate her right to not procreate. It remains to be seen whether Nash
will provide support for the proposition that an individual contributing ga-
metes to potentially create embryos will have his or her right to not procreate
respected as long as parental rights are terminated.
190. See id. ("Tina and James had two sons using the preembryos. H.N. was born in
January, 2006 and T.N. was born in March, 2007.").
191. See id. at *1 ("Tina has two teenage daughters from a previous marriage.").
192. See id. at *4 ("The order also provides that '[n]o other person has any parental
obligations or rights related to the embryos"').
193. Id. at *7 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101 (West 2005).
194. See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.725(1) (West 2005)); see also
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (West 2007) ("If a marriage is dissolved
before the placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record
kept by a licensed physician that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a
divorce the former spouse would be a parent of the child."); ALA. CODE § 26-
17-706(a) (1975); § 19-4-106(7)(a), C.R.S. (West 2009); 13 DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 8-706 (a) (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN., § 14-20-64(1) (West
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11 A-706(A) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78b-15-706(1) (West 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-906(a) (West 2003).
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B. Szafranski
Szafranski v. Dunson involved a dispute between non-marital parties
about the disposition of frozen embryos.195 Karla Dunston was diagnosed
with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and was advised that the recommended treat-
ment would likely destroy her fertility.196 Dunston was in a relationship with
Jacob Szafranski, whom she asked to donate sperm so that she could create
pre-embryos prior to the commencement of her treatment. 97
Szafranski and Dunston consulted an attorney, Nidhi Desai, who
"presented them with two possible arrangements: a co-parent agreement or a
sperm donor agreement."198 Dunston sent an email to Desai opting for the co-
parent agreement, and Desai sent the couple a draft of such an agreement.199
The co-parenting agreement provided that the couple "would attempt to par-
ticipate in at least one in vitro fertilization and pre-embryo transfer cycle" 200
and that Szafranski "agree[d] to undertake all legal, custodial and other obli-
gations to the child regardless of any change of circumstance between the
parties."201 The agreement further suggested that "[s]hould the intended par-
ents separate, Karla will control the disposition of the embryos."202 However,
the "co-parent agreement was never signed by the couple."203 Failure to sign
the agreement notwithstanding, Szafranski deposited sperm, and eight eggs
were retrieved from Dunsten. 20 4 Their doctor advised them that fertilizing all
of the eggs would give them the best chance of having a child, and they
followed that advice.205
The eggs were fertilized in April, and Szafranski sent Dunsten a text
message ending their relationship in May.206 In August, Szafranski sought to
195. See Szafranski v. Dunson, 993 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Il. App. Ct. 2013) ("This
appeal is a case of first impression in Illinois involving a dispute between
plaintiff-appellant, Jacob Szafranski, and defendant-appellee, Karla Dunston
[ J, over the right to use pre-embryos created with appellant's sperm and appel-
lee's ova.").
196. Id. ("[H]er chemotherapy treatments would likely cause the loss of her
fertility.").
197. See id.
198. Id. at 504.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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permanently enjoin Dunsten from using the pre-embryos.207 In response,
Dunsten offered three distinct arguments as to why she should be permitted
to use the embryos. First, she noted that although he did not sign the agree-
ment, he performed his obligation under the agreement by providing the
sperm samples 2 08 By doing so, he induced her to rely on his promise to help
her have children biologically related to her. 209 Further, he knew that fertiliz-
ing the eggs with his sperm would preclude her from fertilizing the eggs with
donor sperm, which meant that the embryos represented her only chance to
have children biologically related to her.210 Finally, even if the court found
that his performance did not bind both parties to the agreement, and even if
the court found her reliance on his promise to help her have children did not
justify his being estopped from preventing her from using the embryos, the
court should nonetheless find that her interest in being a parent outweighed
his interest in not being a parent.211 Szafranski argued that his right not to be
a parent was protected under the Illinois and United States Constitution.212
The Illinois appellate court noted that courts have used different ap-
proaches to resolve frozen embryo disputes, and each approach had benefits
and drawbacks.213 "The benefits of a contractual approach are that it encour-
ages parties to enter into agreements that will avoid future costly litigation,
and that it removes state and court involvement in private family deci-
sions."214 However, the contractual approach may commit an individual to a
course of action before he or she knows the contents or strengths of her
207. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 504-05 ("On August 22, 2011, he filed a pro se
complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking to permanently enjoin
appellee from using the pre-embryos so as to 'preserv[e] [his] right to not forci-
bly father a child against his will.'").
208. See id. at 505 ("[E]ven though he did not sign it, he fully performed his one
'critical' obligation under the agreement and provided sperm samples to create
the embryos.").
209. See id. ("She also asserted that appellant induced her to rely on his representa-
tion that he would help her have her own children.").
210. See id. ("[S]he was harmed by that reliance because now she cannot go back
and use a random sperm donor to fertilize her eggs."); see also id. ("Appellee
attached to her motion a letter from Dr. Eve Feinberg stating that appellee has
ovarian failure as a result of her chemotherapy treatment which has 'rendered
[her] unable to conceive a child with the use of her own oocytes."').
211. See id. at 505 ("[T]he court should ...balance the interests of the parties,
finding that her interest in having her own biological children outweighs appel-
lant's interest in not fathering a child.").
212. See id. ("Appellant claimed that he was entitled to summary judgment based on
the right not to be a parent under the United States and Illinois Constitutions.").
213. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506-08.
214. Id. at 506.
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reactions to some future set of events.21 5 The contemporaneous consent
model "benefits from ease of application and at least the appearance of re-
specting the rights of the parties' involved,"216 although it is also not without
fault. In many instances in which individuals are litigating over the right to
control the disposition of their frozen embryos, they simply will not be able
to reach an agreement.2t 7 Or, any agreement reached might be unconsciona-
ble to one of the parties, because that person's sole chance of being a biologi-
cal parent was held hostage by the other party.2 18 The balancing approach
requires courts to assess whose interests are more important in a "highly
emotional and personal area." 219
After analyzing the pros and cons of each approach, the Dunston court
decided that contracts should be enforced when the parties have previously
made their wishes clear.220 If that has not been done, then the court should
conduct a balancing test.22 1 The court recognized that while not without
fault,222 this approach was preferred over allowing an ex-spouse or partner to
hold the embryos hostage.223 Although it was not clear what the lower court
would do on remand, the Dunston court rejected Szafranski's claim that his
contemporaneous consent was required before implantation could occur 224
215. See id. at 507.
216. Id. at 511.
217. See id. ("[T]he Superior Court of Pennsylvania has aptly noted: 'This approach
strikes us as being totally unrealistic. If the parties could reach an agreement,
they would not be in court."') (citing Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
218. See id. at 512 (citing Strasser, supra note 64, at 1210).
219. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 512 (citing In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d
768, 779 (Iowa 2003)).
220. See id. at 514 ("[T]he best approach for resolving disputes over the disposition
of pre-embryos created with one party's sperm and another party's ova is to
honor the parties' own mutually expressed intent as set forth in their prior
agreements.").
221. See id. at 515 ("In addition to holding that agreements between the parties
should be honored, we further hold that where there has been no advance
agreement regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, 'then the relative interests
of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed.'") (citing
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1992)).
222. See id. ("[W]e acknowledge that this is not an ideal way to resolve a dispute
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and was sympathetic to the claim that "a party's inability to have a child
weighs in her favor."225
C. Reber
In Reber v. Reiss, a Pennsylvania Superior court was asked to decide
who should be awarded the couples' frozen embryos. Andrea Reiss had been
diagnosed with breast cancer,226 and she and Brett Reber were advised that
they should use IVF if they wished to have a child.227 Andrea deferred her
cancer treatments so that she and her husband could harvest the eggs and
create the embryos. 228 Andrea then had extensive treatment.229 Brett filed for
divorce from Andrea two and a half years after the embryos were created.230
He then began a relationship with someone else and they had a son to-
gether.23' The parties and the trial court characterized the embryos as prop-
erty subject to equitable distribution.232 Brett made his intention clear to have
the embryos destroyed, while Andrea made clear that she intended to have
the embryos implanted.233There was no prior agreement between the parties
about what should be done with the embryos in the event of divorce, and it
seemed extremely unlikely that the parties could come to an agreement at the
225. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 515 (citing Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140 (Pa.
Super. 2012).
226. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1132 ("In November 2003, Wife, at the age of 36, was diag-
nosed with breast cancer.").
227. Id. ("As a result of the diagnosis and proposed recommended cancer treat-
ments, the parties were advised to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) to pre-
serve Wife's ability to conceive a child.").
228. See id. at 1132-33 ("To accommodate the IVF process, Wife deferred the com-
mencement of her cancer treatment for several months. In February and March
2004, Husband and Wife underwent the IVF process resulting in the production
of thirteen pre-embryos using Husband's sperm and Wife's eggs.").
229. See id. at 1133 ("After undergoing the IVF process, Wife proceeded with ex-
tensive breast cancer treatments including two surgeries, eight rounds of chem-
otherapy and 37 rounds of radiation.").
230. See id.
231. Id. ("[A]pproximately 18 months after he and Wife separated, Husband's bio-
logical son [from another woman] was born.").
232. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1133 ("The parties agree, as does the [trial] court, that the
pre-embryos are marital property subject to equitable distribution.").
233. See id. at 1134.
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time of divorce.234 The court reasoned that the best way to resolve this issue
was to balance the interests of the parties.35
The court accepted that Andrea would be extremely unlikely to have a
child biologically related to her if she were precluded from using the em-
bryos.236 The court distinguished between having a biologically-related child
from having a child through adoption, suggesting that the two should not be
equated.237 Because of her health history and her age, Andrea would not
likely be viewed favorably when seeking to adopt.238 The likelihood that she
would be unable to adopt led the court to "conclude that Wife's compelling
interests in using the pre-embryos include the fact that these pre-embryos are
the option that provides her with what is likely her only chance at genetic
parenthood and her most reasonable chance for parenthood at all."239
Brett argued that "he, himself, was adopted and he would not want any
of his children not to know his or her biological father."240 The court noted
that the husband's concerns, "based on his own life experiences, are not un-
reasonable,"241 although those concerns were mitigated because the husband
could play a role in the child's life if he desired.242 The husband also worried
that he might be financially responsible for any child born. While the court
seemed to credit the wife's claim that she would do her utmost to prevent
Brett from having to pay support for the child,243 it expressly refused to rely
on that assertion.244 The court rejected the husband's claim that he never
intended to have a child with his wife, noting that he "voluntarily provided
Wife sperm when her doctors suggested she undergo IVF to preserve her
234. See id. at 1136 ("[N]either party had signed the portion of the consent form
related to the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of divorce or death of
one party. Also, it was quite obvious that Husband and Wife could not come to
a contemporaneous mutual agreement regarding the pre-embryos.").
235. Id. ("[T]he balancing approach is the most suitable test.").
236. See id. at 1138.
237. See id. ([S]imply because adoption or foster parenting may be available to
Wife, it does not mean that such options should be given equal weight in a
balancing test.").
238. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1138.




243. See id. at 1141.
244. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1141 ("[T]he trial court did not err in the weight it gave to
Wife's vow not to seek support-the trial court did not rely on the vow and
appropriately left open such a determination until the issue becomes an actual
case or controversy before the court.").
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fertility."45 In any event, absent an agreement specifying what should be
done with the embryos, the competing interests favored the wife's opportu-
nity to have a child.246
A separate issue involves whether a child born post-divorce should be
entitled to support from the unwilling progenitor. Several states have passed
laws specifying that an individual will not be subject to support obligations if
an embryo is implanted post-divorce contrary to the wish of that progeni-
tor,2 47 although even more states have not addressed this issue through their
laws. In states where this issue has not yet been addressed by the legislature,
courts will have little guidance with respect to the proper approach to take.
D. Lewis
Consider Commissioner of Social Services v. Lewis, where Lewis's mar-
riage with his wife was dissolved in May, 2008.248 Incorporated within the
judgment dissolving their marriage was the parties' agreement to have their
frozen embryos destroyed.249 Nonetheless, Lewis's ex-wife had one of the
embryos implanted, which led to a live birth.250 At issue was whether the ex-
husband could be required to support the child.
Connecticut did not have applicable statutory law.251 When the husband
pointed to a Model Act suggesting that he not be required to pay support,252
the court noted that the state had not adopted this act, even though it had
245. Id. at 1140.
246. See id. at 1142 ("[B]ecause Husband and Wife never made an agreement prior
to undergoing IVF, and these pre-embryos are likely Wife's only opportunity to
achieve biological parenthood and her best chance to achieve parenthood at all,
we agree with the trial court that the balancing of the interests tips in Wife's
favor.").
247. See Szafranski v. Dunson, 993 N.E.2d 502, 507-08 (Il1. App. Ct. 2013).
248. Comm'r of Soc. Serv. v. Lewis, No. FA I14059024S, 2013 WL 5969110, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2013) ("The marriage of the plaintiff [mother] and the defen-
dant [father] was dissolved by the Superior Court, Brennan, J.T.R., on May 16,
2008.").
249. See id. ("The judgment of dissolution incorporated by reference an agreement
of the parties (the agreement) which included a provision that the parties agreed
to destroy embryos created and stored during the marriage.").
250. See id. ("The plaintiff caused herself to be implanted with an embryo after the
dissolution and a child was born on March 30, 2009.").
251. See id. at *5 ("[A]t this time there are no statutes that relieve a parent of a child
conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF) from the duty to support.").
252. See id. ("The defendant further states that the American Bar Association Model
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology . . . provides that '[i]n the
event that a transfer [of an embryo] occurs after receipt of notice in a record of
that individual's intent to avoid gestation ... that intended parent will not be
the parent of a resulting child.'").
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adopted others.253The magistrate found that the defendant voluntarily created
the embryos. 254 Further, while the couple had agreed to destroy the embryos,
the defendant had nonetheless subsequently admitted paternity of the child
born from the embryo.2 55 Finally, when he admitted paternity, he had not
taken any exception to supporting the child,256 presumably because a blood
test would reveal that he was the child's father, resulting in a support obliga-
tion.2-57 The order of support was affirmed.258
A separate question was whether the ex-husband could sue his former
wife for willfully violating the agreement to destroy the embryos.259 Al-
though this was not resolved, forcing the mother to reimburse the father for
his support would undermine the rationale used by the magistrate because "in
the absence of statutory authority[,] it is in the best interest of the child to be
supported by both parents." 260 Thus, if one of the reasons to order support
from both parents is that the child would thereby benefit, ordering the mother
to reimburse the father for his support as part of the damages award for vio-
lating the order to destroy the embryos would deplete the family purse that
provided for the child.261 Parents are not permitted to bargain away child
253. See id. at *2 ("The defendant properly points out that Connecticut has, in other
instances, enacted legislation in substantial conformity with other model acts.
The legislature has not done so, at least not yet, in this regard.").
254. Lewis, 2013 WL 5969110, at *2 ("[T]he defendant signed a prior consent for
the IVF .... ).
255. See id. ("[T]he defendant . . .volitionally signed the acknowledgment of
paternity[.]").
256. See id. at *4 ("The defendant did not refuse to sign the form. He was repre-
sented by counsel at the juvenile court proceeding and his counsel took his
acknowledgement on the form. There is no evidence that he took any steps to
disavow his obligation to support the child-until he was served with the sup-
port petition.").
257. See id. ("The defendant freely acknowledges that he is the biological father of
the child and avers that, if he had declined to sign the acknowledgement, a
DNA test would establish his biological paternity and the end result would
have been a judgment of paternity and a finding of an obligation to support.").
258. See id. at *6.
259. See id. at *4 ("The magistrate properly determined that his decision to require
the defendant father to pay support does not diminish any relief that may be
afforded to the defendant if the plaintiff is found to be in contempt for willful
violation of the terms of the judgment.").
260. Lewis, 2013 WL 5969110, at *4.
261. Cf Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 857 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) ("[I]t is difficult to grasp how it is in the best interest of the child to
deplete the resources of the family.").
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support 62 if doing so would undermine the child's best interests.263 It would
seem surprising that the parent would be forced to pay child support but
could also recoup those costs (perhaps in addition to others) in a suit against
the child's custodial parent.
The Lewis court did not discuss whether the ex-husband might seek
damages against other parties; for example, if someone wrongfully implanted
the embryo while knowing that one of the progenitors had not given consent.
States have adopted different ways to deter wrongful implantations,264 and
tort liability might be another way to assure that implantation only takes
place with appropriate consent from the parties. But was Lewis's consent
needed before the implantation? When Lewis and his wife signed the consent
form, did they agree that only her authorization was necessary? Regardless,
states will have to decide the conditions under which an individual who con-
tributes gametes to produce embryos may be held financially responsible for
children born after the implantation of such embryos, if that implantation
occurred without the individual's consent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Counseling individuals and couples interested in using IVF is increas-
ingly complex. In some jurisdictions, the initial agreement regarding the dis-
position of frozen embryos is enforceable, but in other jurisdictions even a
clear and unambiguous agreement will not be enforced if one of the parties
has since changed his or her position. In some instances, individuals who fear
the loss of future fertility may be better served by cryopreserving sperm or
eggs rather than embryos, because cryopreserving the latter may result in that
individual becoming a genetic parent to the other progenitor's veto. That
said, some recent cases suggest that progenitors will not always be afforded
the power to veto implantation of embryos that they helped create and, fur-
ther, that those progenitors may be held legally responsible for child support.
262. See Guidash v. Tome, 66 A.3d 122, 13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) ("[T]hey
[parents] may not waive or bargain away a minor child's right to support.").
263. See Lester v. Lester, 736 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("The
fact that parents may not waive or otherwise 'contract away' their child's right
to support ... does not preclude them from making contracts or agreements
concerning their child's support so long as the best interests of the child are
served.") (citing Warrick v. Hender, 198 So.2d 348, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967)).
264. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:101.2 (West 1999) ("A. No person shall
knowingly use a sperm, ovum, or embryo, through the use of assisted reproduc-
tion technology, for any purpose other than that indicated by the sperm, ovum,
or embryo provider's signature on a written consent form. B. No person shall
knowingly implant a sperm, ovum, or embryo, through the use of assisted re-
production technology, into a recipient ... without the signed consent of the
... provider and recipient.).
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Courts sometimes discuss the right to procreate and the right not to pro-
create without explaining what these rights protect. For example, does the
right not to procreate include the right not to be a genetic parent against one's
will, even if local law imposes no obligations on the unwilling progenitor
with respect to a child born of an implantation after the end of the adults'
relationship? Specification of what that right includes should also discuss the
conditions, if any, under which one waives that right. Presumably, authoriz-
ing an embryo implantation involves a waiver of the right not to procreate
with respect to the implanted embryo. However, agreeing to an implantation
now does not waive the right to object to future implantations.
Courts may be using the expressions "right to procreate' and "right not
to procreate" as a shorthand way of recognizing that important interests are
implicated when the possible implantation of embryos is at issue. Where the
right not to procreate precludes a progenitor from donating embryos to a
third party over the other progenitor's objections, the court is recognizing
that individuals may have an interest in not having children that the progeni-
tor will never know, even if the progenitor will have no legal obligations
with respect to that child. Yet, the interest one has in not being a parent may
be outweighed by the other progenitor's interest in using the embryos himself
or herself if that is the only way to have a genetically-related child. Yet, it is
also true that some courts treat the right not to be a parent as affording a kind
of veto power, which precludes frozen embryos being used by anyone over
the progenitor's objections, prior agreement to use the embryos
notwithstanding.
Some states have passed legislation that denies a progenitor parental
rights and obligations if the ex-partner has the embryo implanted after the
adults' relationship has ended. By doing so, states presumably make it more
likely that at least some individuals will not object to the use of frozen em-
bryos by the ex-partner. It is unclear whether individuals can achieve a simi-
lar result by contract, i.e., one party agrees not to contest the use of the
embryos if no rights or obligations will be imposed on that party with respect
to any child born from the embryos.
Many states are silent regarding the progenitor's obligation to children
born as a result of implantation, even when that implantation was not per-
formed with the progenitor's consent. Without such laws, it is not even clear
what law should be considered when courts are deciding whether an obliga-
tion can be imposed. As a general matter, individuals are financially respon-
sible for their biological children, even if they had no interest in being or
becoming a parent. Yet, there are various respects in which IVF is not analo-
gous to coital reproduction, which may mean that our general approaches to
parental responsibility from coital intimacy are inapplicable to the IVF
context.
Until recently, courts were not forced to address the implications of an
individual becoming an unwilling parent because of a prior IVF agreement,
or even how to weigh competing interests with respect to parenthood in the
IVF context. Because the differing approaches all (allegedly) led to the same
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answer-do not implant absent concurrent consent-courts were able to
avoid issues that would be raised were implantation permitted, and a child
born. But now that courts are acknowledging that the agreements and back-
ground interests may require permitting implantation, courts and legislatures
will have to work out a host of issues.
The frozen embryo custody disputes usually involve one individual who
wants to donate or destroy the embryos, and another who wishes to use them.
Suppose, however, that each of progenitors wants to implant the embryos.
What criteria should be used in such a case? Would it matter if one of the
parties was more likely to have a successful implantation? Should custody of
any child resulting from implantation be decided later in light of a best inter-
ests test, considering all of the great personal costs that one of the parties
might have incurred to bring about the live birth?
Where there was a perceived unwritten rule that embryos would not be
implanted over a progenitor's objections, choice of law considerations might
not have been considered very important. However, if only some states are
willing to award embryos to the progenitor, choice of law considerations will
become more prominent, especially if the progenitors live in different states.
In short, now that frozen embryos may be implanted over one of the progeni-
tor's objections, state legislatures and courts would be well-advised to pass
laws and offer analyses that guide dispute resolution in an area of law with
fierce contests over extremely important interests.
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